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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Albert A. Ciccone appeals from the judgment and sentence entered upon
the jury verdicts finding him guilty of one count of first degree murder and one
count of second degree murder.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
On October 16, 2003, Ciccone drove at an estimated speed of 50 miles
per hour and intentionally struck his pregnant wife, Kathleen, with his vehicle as
she walked away from him following an argument. (Trial Tr.,1 p.1112, Ls.4-18,
p.1114, Ls. 11-18, p.1124, L.20 - p.1125, L.4, p.1130, L.20 - p.1131, L.17;
State's Exhibits2 62, 63.) The car hit Kathleen with such force that she bounced
off the windshield, launched into the air, went through a fence and slammed
against a tree 75 feet away from the point of impact.

(Trial Tr., p.483, L.10 -

p.485, L.19, p.506, L.17 - p.509, L.12, p.1116, Ls.9-18.) Witnesses at the scene
immediately called 911 and rushed to Kathleen's side. (Trial Tr., p.508, Ls.18-

1 By order of the Idaho Supreme Court, the appellate record in this case has
been augmented with the "Court File, Reporter's Transcript, and Clerk's Record"
filed in Ciccone's prior appeal, State v. Ciccone, Docket No. 36877 (formerly
designated Docket No. 32179). (5/31/11 Order Augmenting Appeal.) Consistent
with the Appellant's brief, citations herein to the appellate record and transcript(s)
prepared in Docket No. 36877 contain no identifying prefix. The supplemental
clerk's record prepared for this appeal, Docket No. 38817, is cited herein as
"#38817 R"
2 The state is, contemporaneously with the filing of this brief, filing a motion to
augment the appellate record with several documents that were submitted as
exhibits in Ciccone's prior appeal, Docket No. 36877. Specifically, the state is
requesting an order augmenting the appellate record with State's Exhibits 62 and
63, both of which were admitted as exhibits at Ciccone's trial, and with the PSI
and its attachments.
1

22, p.510, L.16 - p.511, L.22, p.513, L.24 - p.514, L.16.) Ciccone, on the other
hand, got out of his car, looked from a distance at Kathleen's lifeless body and
walked away from the scene. (Trial Tr., p.515, L.6 - p.519, L.19.)
Law enforcement and rescue personnel subsequently found Ciccone in
the desert about a mile and a half away from the crash site. (Trial Tr., p.609, L.1
- p.611, L.19, p.669, L.6 - p.671, L.22, p.992, L.18 - p.993, L.3, p.1165, Ls.8-13,
p.1179, Ls.14-16, p.1311, L.18 - p.1313, L.11.) He was relatively unscathed, did
not display any physical symptoms of shock and, although he claimed to have
blacked out, had no confirmed neurological trauma.

(Trial Tr., p.614, Ls.5-12,

p.672, L.5 - p.677, L.8, p.683, L.22 - p.684, L.22, p.1166, L.5 - p.1167, LA,
p.1170, L.10 - p.1178, L.13, p.1181, L.16 - p.1182, L.9, p.1318, L.5 - p.1329,
L.2.) He was treated at the hospital for a sore ankle and released the same night
to the custody of law enforcement. (Trial Tr., p.1166, L.10 - p.1167, LA, p.1475,
L.19 - p.1476, L.14.) Kathleen suffered multiple head fractures and she and her
unborn child died at the scene. (Trial Tr., p.563, L.23 - p.565, L.21, p.576, L.21
- p.577, L.14, p.603, L.18 - p.604, LA, p.664, L.25 - p.667, L.10, p.1309, LS.124.)
The state charged Ciccone with two counts of first degree murder. (R.,
vol. I, pp.60-61.) Following a trial, a jury found Ciccone guilty of the first degree
murder of Kathleen and the second degree murder of the fetus Kathleen was
carrying when she died.

(R., vol. II, pp.286-93.)

The district court entered

judgment on the jury's verdicts and imposed a fixed life sentence upon Ciccone's
conviction for first degree murder and a concurrent fixed 15-year sentence upon
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his conviction for second degree murder.

(R., vol. II, pp.338-41.)

Ciccone

appealed (R., vol. II, pp.346-50) but, after the case was briefed and argued to
both the Idaho Court of Appeals and the Idaho Supreme Court, the Idaho
Supreme Court dismissed the appeal on the basis that it was not timely from the
judgment of conviction, State v. Ciccone, 150 Idaho 305, 246 P.3d 958 (2010).
Pursuant to a stipulation and order entered in post-conviction proceedings, the
district court reentered judgment to permit Ciccone to file a timely direct appeal.
(#38817 R., pp.16-20.) Ciccone filed a timely notice of appeal on April 26, 2011.
(#38817 R., pp.21-25.)
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ISSUES
Ciccone states the issues on appeal as:
1.

Did the prosecutor engage in misconduct by twice
commenting on Mr. Ciccone's silence and then asking the
jury to convict Mr. Ciccone based on sympathy for the
victim?

2.

Were Mr. Ciccone's speedy trial rights violated when, on the
eve of trial, the district court granted the State's motion for a
continuance and set Mr. Ciccone's trial out an additional six
months?

3.

Is Mr. Ciccone's fixed life sentence for first degree murder
excessive given any view of the facts?

(Appellant's brief, p.g.)
The state rephrases the issues on appeal as:
1.

Has Ciccone failed to show he is entitled to relief with respect to any of his
claims of prosecutorial misconduct?

2.

Has Ciccone failed to establish a violation of either his constitutional or
statutory speedy trial rights?

3.

Has Ciccone failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion
in imposing a fixed life sentence upon his conviction for first degree
murder?

4

ARGUMENT
I.

Ciccone Is Not Entitled To Relief On Any Of His Prosecutorial Misconduct Claims

A.

Introduction
Ciccone argues that the prosecutor made several comments during the

rebuttal portion of the state's closing argument that prejudiced his right to a fair
trial. (Appellant's brief, pp.9-21.) Ciccone has failed to establish any basis for
reversal, however, because has failed to show any impropriety with respect to
the only comment to which he objected, and he has otherwise failed to carry his
burden of demonstrating that the remaining comments, to which he did not
object, amount to fundamental error.

B.

Standard Of Review And General Legal Standards Governing Claims Of
Prosecutorial Misconduct
"[T]he standard of review governing claims of prosecutorial misconduct

depends on whether the defendant objected to the misconduct at trial." State v.
Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 715, 215 P.3d 414, 435 (2009). If the alleged error
was followed by a contemporaneous objection at trial, the defendant bears the
initial burden on appeal of establishing that the complained of conduct was
improper.

State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227, 245 P.3d 961, 979 (2010).

"Where the defendant meets his initial burden of showing that a violation
occurred, the State then has the burden of demonstrating to the appellate court
beyond a reasonable doubt that the constitutional violation did not contribute to
the jury's verdict."

lsi
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When, on the other hand, a defendant fails to timely object at trial to
allegedly improper closing arguments by the prosecutor, the conviction will be set
aside for prosecutorial misconduct only upon a showing by the defendant that the
alleged misconduct rises to the level of fundamental error.

!sL at

228, 245 P.3d

at 980. Review under the fundamental error doctrine requires the defendant to
demonstrate that (1) "one or more of the defendant's unwaived constitutional
rights were violated;" (2) the constitutional error is "clear or obvious" on the
record, "without the need for any additional information" including information "as
to whether the failure to object was a tactical decision;" and (3) "the error affected
the defendant's substantial rights," generally by showing a reasonable probability
that the error "affected the outcome of the trial proceedings."

!sL at 226,

245 P.3d

at 978 (footnote omitted).
Whether preserved by objection at trial or reviewed for fundamental error,
a mere assertion or finding that a particular question or statement was
objectionable or improper is insufficient to establish prosecutorial misconduct. As
explained by the United States Supreme Court:

"[I]t is not enough that the

prosecutors' remarks were undesirable or even universally condemned.

The

relevant question is whether the prosecutors' comments so infected the trial with
unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process." Darden
v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986) (internal quotations and citations
omitted); see also Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 219 (1982) ("[T]he touchstone
of due process analysis in cases of alleged prosecutorial misconduct is the
fairness of the trial, not the culpability of the prosecutor.") State v. Reynolds, 120
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Idaho 445,451,816 P.2d 1002,1008 (Ct. App. 1991) (the function of appellate
review is "not to discipline the prosecutor for misconduct, but to ensure that any
such misconduct did not interfere with the defendant's right to a fair trial").

C.

Ciccone Is Not Entitled To Relief On Either Of His Allegations That The
Prosecutor Engaged In Misconduct By Commenting On His Silence
Ciccone argues the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by "twice

comment[ing]" on Ciccone's failure to testify during his rebuttal closing argument.
(Appellant's brief, pp.10-16.) Ciccone's claims fail because the arguments he
challenges, when reviewed in context, are neither improper nor fundamental
error.
Prosecutors have considerable latitude in closing argument and have the
right to discuss the evidence and the inferences and deductions arising
therefrom. State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 548,566, 199 P.3d 123, 141 (2008); State
v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 280, 77 P.3d 956, 969 (2003); State v. Phillips, 144
Idaho 82, 86, 156 P.3d 583, 587 (Ct. App. 2007).

The purpose of the

prosecutor's closing argument is to enlighten the jury and help the jurors
remember and interpret the evidence. State v. Reynolds, 120 Idaho 445, 450,
816 P.2d 1002, 1007 (Ct. App. 1991).

Where, as here, the complained of

comments occurred during a rebuttal closing argument, the United States
Supreme Court has held, "[t]he prosecutors' comments must be evaluated in light
of the defense argument that preceded it." Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168,
179 (1986).
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In this case, two of the statements about which Ciccone complains were
made in response to the general theme of defense counsel's closing argument,
and the theory of Ciccone's defense, that Kathleen's death was nothing more
than a tragic accident that occurred because Ciccone was "in a hurry" and "going
too fast." (Trial Tr., p.1826, Ls.10-12, p.1828, Ls.11-22, p.1842, Ls.5-8, p.1845,
Ls.12-24, p.1846, Ls.11-13, p.1847, Ls.1-2.) Ciccone did not testify at trial, but
his version of the events leading to Kathleen's death was admitted in the form of
Mirandized statements he made to the lead detective during two custodial

interviews.

(Trial Tr., p.1476, L.4 - p.1477, L.25, p.1491, L.8 - p.1492, L.15,

p.15, L.18, p.1505, Ls.7-11; State's Exhibits 62, 63.) As part of his closing
argument, counsel for Ciccone referred to Ciccone's statements during one of
the interviews and asked the jury to reject the state's theory that Ciccone and
Kathleen had an argument immediately before Ciccone ran Kathleen down in the
road. Specifically, counsel argued:
Now, we have seen from the evidence on the K & R ranch
Road that we have French fries, we had cigarettes, we had Icee,
we had a sweater, we had a purse, we had track marks all on the K
& R Ranch Road.
[Ciccone] stated in the interview Kathleen had the food on
her side. The purse was found in the middle of the road. But think
about it. A woman's purse. That's a sacred thing. The State
seems to imply that [Ciccone] was throwing the purse. [Ciccone]
was throwing the medicine. [Ciccone] was throwing the food.
That's totally inconsistent with our day-to-day norm. It is totally
inconsistent with the evidence.
They don't dispute the fact that the bag, the Burger King,
and the Icee was in Kathleen's possession. How many women do
we know that will reach in a car that she is a passenger in and put
the purse somewhere where [Ciccone] could throw it at her? That
simply does not make sense.
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So you have got a purse. You have got food. You have got
a tiff, you've got a huff, however you want to classify it. The
accident scene.
(Trial Tr., p.1833, L.5 - p.1834, L.3.)
In response, the prosecutor argued:
Let's talk about [counsel] talking about the scene on K & R
Ranch Road. How this precious purse a woman would have
carried, the bag of food she obviously had in her possession
because that's what [Ciccone] said.
So I guess she has got the purse in the car, the bag of food
in the car, the medicine, the sweater tied around her and
everything. And she decided to get out with all of that stuff on K &
R Ranch Road ... and decided to walk however many feet -- let's
just say -- it is on the chart -- walk up there with all the purse,
sweatshirt tied around her waist, bottle of pills, and all the food bag,
and had enough wherewithal to throw it all at him right- or lefthanded. Maybe she put the purse down to get the McDonalds bag
or Burger King to throw at him. Maybe she just left it there. I don't
know. There's only two people that know, and Kathleen Ciccone
isn't here to tell us.
(Trial Tr., p.1853, Ls.3-23.)
For the first time on appeal, Ciccone argues that the last sentence of the
prosecutor's argument, referring to "only two people that know," was an
impermissible comment on Ciccone's failure to testify "because he is the only
one who could have told the jury the circumstances of his argument with
Kathleen." (Appellant's brief, p.12.) Ciccone, however, has failed to show that
the complained

of comments constituted

misconduct at all,

much

less

misconduct rising to the level of fundamental error.
When considered in context, it is clear the prosecutor was not commenting
on Ciccone's failure to testify.

Quite the contrary, the prosecutor was only
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responding to defense counsel's reference to Ciccone's explanation during his
interview with Detective Wolfe about the state of certain evidence, such as
Kathleen's purse, at the murder scene and how that explanation was supposedly
consistent with Ciccone's claim that he "accidentally" hit Kathleen with his car.
Because

the

prosecutor's

comments

centered

around

Ciccone's

actual

statements and Kathleen's inability to refute them, rather than Ciccone's failure to
testify, Ciccone has failed to establish error, much less any constitutional error
that is "clear or obvious" from the record and actually prejudiced Ciccone's right
to a fair trial. Perry, 150 Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at 978.
Ciccone's second claim of prosecutorial misconduct is similar to his first in
that it is based on an assertion that the prosecutor made an impermissible
reference to Ciccone's failure to testify. Specifically, Ciccone complains about
the following comments made during the prosecutor's rebuttal closing:
There is no testimony that he was looking down at is [sic]
watch, that the cigarette smoke had blown in his face, that he was
changing the radio station, that a cassette dropped, a cigarette
dropped in his pants, he had to try and put it out real quick. No
testimony as to that. Absolutely none. He doesn't say anything
about any-(Trial Tr., p.1856, Ls.2-9.)
Ciccone objected to this argument, the court sustained the objection, and
a discussion was held off the record. (Trial Tr., p.1856, Ls.10-13.) In addition, at
the conclusion of the prosecutor's rebuttal closing, the court admonished the jury:
Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, the jury will disregard any
argument based upon what the defendant did not say. As stated
earlier in instruction 55, a defendant in a criminal trial has a
constitutional right not to be compelled to testify. The decision of
whether to testify is left to the defendant acting with the advice and
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assistance of the defendant's lawyer. You must not draw any
inference of guilt from the fact the defendant did not testify."
(Trial Tr., p.1861, L.25 - p.1861, L.4.)
Ciccone argues the prosecutor's comments violated his Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendment right to silence because "he is the only one who could
have offered 'testimony' to explain how it was that he was unable to avoid hitting
his wife with his vehicle."

(Appellant's brief, p.12.)

Ciccone's argument fails

because, although the district court sustained Ciccone's objection to the
prosecutor's argument and the court's subsequent admonishment indicates it did
so on the theory that the prosecutor's comments were an improper reference to
Ciccone's failure to testify, the prosecutor's comments can equally be viewed as
a comment not on Ciccone's silence or his failure to testify, but on the absence of
any reasonable explanation during his interview with Detective Wolfe from which
the jury could conclude Kathleen's death was the result of an accident.
While it is undoubtedly true that a prosecutor may not comment on a
defendant's silence or his failure to testify as evidence of his guilt, State v.
Severson, 147 Idaho 694,718-19,215 P.3d 414,438-39 (2009), the prosecutor's
comments must be viewed in light of the evidence presented to the jury, and the
Court should not "lightly infer ... the most damaging meaning" or assume the
jury "dr[e]w that meaning from. .. less damaging interpretations." Donnelly v.
DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637,647 (1974) quoted in Severson, 147 Idaho at 719,
214 P.3d at 439. Rather, as explained in State v. Reynolds, 120 Idaho 445,44950, 816 P.2d 1002, 1006-07 (Ct. App. 1991), "the propriety of a given argument
will depend largely upon the facts of each case" and the prosecutor may properly
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present argument based on the evidence in the record. See also Severson, 147
Idaho at 719, 215 P.3d at 439 (prosecutor's "comments must be evaluated 'in
light of defense conduct and in the context of the entire trial"') (citations omitted).
The evidence in the record in this case included the transcripts of two
interviews between Detective Wolfe and Ciccone.

(State's Exhibits 62, 63.)

During those interviews, Ciccone talked about the "accident," but never gave any
reasonable explanation of how the "accident" occurred, such as those suggested
by the prosecutor during his rebuttal closing argument. While the prosecutor's
use of the word "testimony" in making his argument may have been inartful, it is
plausible that he was merely referring to the absence of any reasonable
explanation during Ciccone's interviews, not on his failure to testify or his postMiranda silence because Ciccone was undoubtedly not silent during those
interviews.

Given the two possible interpretations of the prosecutor's rebuttal

argument regarding the absence of "testimony" regarding how an "accident" may
have occurred, the Court "cannot conclude that [the prosecutor's comment] was
manifestly intended to be, or of such a character that the jury would naturally and
necessarily take it to be" an impermissible reference to Ciccone's failure to
testify. Reynolds, 120 Idaho at 450,816 P.2d at 1007. See also Severson, 147
Idaho at 719, 215 P.3d at 439 (declining to attach most damaging meaning to
prosecutor's statement that "Nobody knows, that has testified, what happened
between" the victim and the defendant).
Ciccone also argues that the court's admonishment was insufficient to
remedy the prejudice attendant to what he deems to be the prosecutor's
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impermissible comments on his silence. (Appellant's brief, pp.14-15.) Ciccone is
incorrect. Even assuming this Court views the comments as an infringement on
Ciccone's Fifth Amendment rights, any potential prejudice was cured by the
court's instruction to the jury that it was to "disregard any argument based upon
what the defendant did not say," and "must not draw any inference of guilt from
the fact [Ciccone] did not testify."

(Trial Tr., p.1860, L.24 - p.1861, L.g.)

Ciccone's claim that this Court is precluded from finding the error harmless under
State v. Lopez, 141 Idaho 575, 114 P.3d 133 (Ct. App. 2005), is without merit.
(Appellant's brief, p.15.)
In Lopez, the defendant claimed his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment
rights were violated "when the state attempted to impeach him by questioning
him and a detective regarding his failure to tell the officers his version of the
events immediately after the incident."

141 Idaho at 577, 114 P.3d at 135.

Although Lopez did not object to the questions at trial, the appellate court
addressed his claim under a pre-Perry fundamental error analysis, and
concluded the "state's comments in closing argument [were] impermissible uses
of post-Miranda silence."

1st

at 577-78, 114 P.3d at 135-36.

Importantly,

however, the court then conducted a harmless error analysis, noting the error
was not reversible unless it was prejudicial.

1st

at 578, 114 P.3d at 136. As

such, Lopez clearly does not stand for the proposition advocated by Ciccone, i.e.,
that whenever a claim of prosecutorial misconduct based upon a comment on the
defendant's silence is reviewed under the fundamental error doctrine, the error
can never be harmless because it cannot be cured by a judicial admonition.
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(Appellant's brief, p.15.) To the contrary, both before and after the reformulation
of the fundamental error standard in Perry, the Idaho appellate courts have
consistently subjected claims reviewed under the fundamental error doctrine to a
harmless error analysis, including claims based on alleged prosecutorial
misconduct in closing argument.

See,~,

State v. Adamcik, _

P.3d _ ,

2012 WL 206006 *33 (Idaho, Jan. 25, 2012) (rehearing denied Feb. 8, 2012)
(defendant failed to demonstrate prosecutor's objected-to improper closing
remarks were not harmless where jury was instructed that prosecutor's closing
statements were not evidence); Perry, 150 Idaho at 228, 245 P.3d at 980
(defendant alleging prosecutorial misconduct for first time on appeal must not
only demonstrate a clear violation of an unwaived constitutional right, but must
also demonstrate that the alleged error "was not harmless"); State v. Timmons,
145 Idaho 279, _,178 P.3d 644, 657 (Ct. App. 2008); State v. Kuhn, 139 Idaho
710,715-16,685 P.3d 1109, 1114-15 (Ct. App. 2003); State v. Cortez, 135 Idaho
561, 566, 21 P.3d 498, 503 (Ct. App. 2001); State v. Brown, 131 Idaho 61, 70,
951 P.2d 1288, 1297 (Ct. App. 1998).
Because, even assuming the prosecutor's statements were improper, the
error was harmless due to the court's curative instruction, which the jury was
presumed to have followed, Ciccone has failed to establish a due process
violation entitling him to a new trial.
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D.

The Prosecutor's Unobjected-To Reference To Kathleen's Death As A
Tragedy And His Request For Justice Did Not Constitute Misconduct
In his closing argument, counsel for Ciccone, after asserting Kathleen's

death was nothing more than a tragic accident, argued:
Forget about the lawyers and lawsuit. He wishes he could
bring her back, but he can't. So June Ciccone, Kathy Figueredo,
they have held their kids in their hands all these years. I have held
[Ciccone] in my hands for the past year. Now I am going to hand
him over to you, each of you individually. You each hold [Ciccone]
in your hands. You each have the power to make a decision. You
each have the ability to decide how to handle this case, each and
every one of you. And you can't let anybody else bully you. You
can't let anybody else step on you. You have to go back there in
that room, that little room back there, and decide. You, each of
you, have to decide.

You each have got [Ciccone] in your hands. You each get to
decide. You each have that power. So use it, use it faithfully.
Follow the rules given to you by the judge. Make sure he proves
any case he has got beyond a reasonable doubt. Look at that
evidence. Because right now, I am giving you [Ciccone]. Thank
you.
(Trial Tr., p.1847, L.13 - p.1848, L.13.)
In rebuttal closing, the prosecutor commented, in relevant part:
This case is about Kathleen Ciccone's death, not the
mother's pains, not about Albert Ciccone's being in the hands of
[defense counsel]. It is about how and why she died.
When you kill somebody, you take away everything they
have and everything they ever will have. Kathleen was 22 years
old. Her death is a tragedy. Give her life meaning and give her
death the sense of justice that it requires. Hold the defendant
accountable for the purposeful, willful, deliberate, premeditated
actions that he took that night. Thank you.
(Trial Tr., p.1860, Ls.15-22.)
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Although he did not object to any of the foregoing comments at trial,
Ciccone argues on appeal that the prosecutor's comments in rebuttal were
"plainly improper" and rose to the level of fundamental error because, he
contends, "they asked the jury to convict Mr. Ciccone for a reason wholly
irrelevant to his actual guilt or innocence - its sympathy for the deceased victim."
(Appellant's brief, p.19.)

More specifically, Ciccone claims "the prosecutor's

focus on everything that had been lost when Kathleen died, and the sheer
tragedy of her death, was an unabashed plea for the jury to convict Mr. Ciccone
of the greatest charge, first degree murder, based on its sympathy for the victim."
(Appellant's brief, p.19.) Ciccone's claim fails on all three prongs of the Perry
test for fundamental error.
The Idaho Supreme Court recently reiterated the standards applicable to a
claim of fundamental error arising from a prosecutor's alleged appeal to the
passions and prejudices of the jury:
It is generally recognized that a prosecutor may not
comment on the victim's family during closing argument in order to
appeal to the sympathies of the jury. Such extraneous statements
are considered improper because their only purpose is to
encourage the jury to identify with the victim. Whether such
comments constitute fundamental error, however, must be
considered in the context of the entire trial.
Severson, 147 Idaho at 720, 215 P.3d at 440, quoted in Adamcik, _

P.3d at

_ , 2012 WL 206006 *33. Here, when considered in context, it is clear that the
prosecutor's characterization of Kathleen's death as a tragedy was not an
"unabashed plea for the jury to convict" Ciccone of first-degree murder. Rather,
the prosecutor was merely repeating what Ciccone himself already argued. That
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the prosecutor followed his shared belief that Kathleen's death was a tragedy
with a request for justice, did not render the comment misconduct, nor was his
request that the jury give Kathleen's death justice and hold Ciccone accountable
improper.

See State v. Larsen, 81 Idaho 90, 98, 337 P.2d 1, 6 (1959) ("The

general rule is that argument by the prosecuting attorney merely urging the jurors
in a criminal prosecution to do their duty, and to enforce the criminal law
generally or the particular law under which the prosecution was instituted, does
not constitute a ground for a new trial or a reversal but is within the range of
proper argument.") (citation omitted); State v. Adams, 147 Idaho 857, 864, 216
P .3d 146, 153 (Ct. App. 2009) ("[I]t is permissible for a prosecutor to ask the jury
to do justice if that request is in the context of argument addressing how trial
evidence demonstrates the defendant's guilt. Justice is, after all, the goal of any
criminal trial."). Rather, the prosecutor's rebuttal argument was a proper,
measured response to Ciccone's argument that the jury should "hold [Ciccone] in
[their] hands" and only find him guilty of "accidentally" plowing into his wife at 50
mph, killing her and their unborn child.

Because the argument, viewed in

context, was proper and did not clearly violate Ciccone's constitutional right to
due process, Ciccone's appellate challenge to the argument fails on the first two
prongs of Perry.
Even if this brief portion of the prosecutor's rebuttal argument could be
deemed clearly improper, Ciccone's appellate challenge to the argument fails on
the third prong of the Perry fundamental error analysis because Ciccone has
failed to demonstrate that the error actually affected the outcome of the trial. The
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sole contested element at trial was Ciccone's intent.

Referring to Kathleen's

death as a tragedy and asking the jury to "[g]ive her life meaning and give her
death the sense of justice that it requires," did not so infect the trial with
unfairness that it violated due process because it could not have influenced the
jury to convict Ciccone of first-degree murder without sufficient evidence,
particularly since the jury could have believed conviction of a lesser offense
would be adequate to give Kathleen's "life meaning" and "her death the sense of
justice that it requires." See Adamcik, _

P.3d at _ , 2012 WL 206006 *33

(finding prosecutor's appeal to jurors' sympathy for homicide victim's family was
harmless and stating: "If the evidence presented did not convince the jury, it is
highly unlikely that the jury's sympathy for [the victim] and her family would have
changed its mind.").
Because Ciccone's claims of prosecutorial misconduct raised for the first
time on appeal do not constitute error, much less fundamental error, he is not
entitled to relief. Ciccone is likewise not entitled to relief on the single claim of
prosecutorial misconduct he did preserve for appeal because, to the extent the
prosecutor's comments were improper, any potential prejudice was addressed by
the court's curative instruction.
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II.

The District Court Correctly Applied The Law To The Facts In Concluding That
Ciccone Failed To Establish A Violation Of Either His Statutory Or Constitutional
Speedy Trial Rights
A.

Introduction
A week before trial, the state filed a motion to continue, asserting as the

primary basis for its request that many of its witnesses were active duty military
personnel on temporary duty (''TOY'') outside the state and unavailable for trial.
(R., vol. I, pp.102-09.)

The district court granted the motion over Ciccone's

objection and reset the trial for January 7, 2005, approximately one year after the
filing of the Information.

(R., vol. I, pp.114-17.) Ciccone subsequently filed a

motion to dismiss, claiming a violation of his statutory and constitutional speedy
trial rights. (R., vol. I, pp.168-69.) The district court denied the motion and the
case proceeded to trial. (R., vol. I, pp.180-85; R., vol. II, pp.226-85.)
Ciccone challenges the denial of his motion to dismiss, arguing that the
delay of almost 15 months from his arrest and almost one year from the filing of
the Information to the date of his trial violated his statutory and constitutional
speedy trial rights. (Appellant's brief, pp.21-38.) A review of the record and the
applicable law, however, supports the district court's determination that the delay
was reasonable and did not violate Ciccone's speedy trial rights.

B.

Standard Of Review
Whether there was an infringement of a defendant's right to a speedy trial

presents a mixed question of law and fact. State v. Clark, 135 Idaho 255, 257,
16 P.3d 931, 933 (2000); State v. Avila, 143 Idaho 849,852, 153 P.3d 1195,
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1198 (Ct. App. 2006). The appellate court defers to the trial court's findings of
fact that are supported by substantial and competent evidence, but freely reviews
the trial court's application of the law to the facts found. Avila, 143 Idaho at 852,
153 P.3d at 1198, State v. Davis, 141 Idaho 828,835,118 P.3d 160, 167 (Ct.
App.2005).

C.

Ciccone Has Failed To Show A Violation Of His Statutory Right To A
Speedy Trial
1.

The District Court Correctly Applied The Law To The Facts In
Concluding That Good Cause Existed To Continue The Trial
Beyond The Six-Month Statutory Speedy Trial Period Of I. C. § 193501

Idaho Code § 19-3501 supplements the speedy trial provisions of the
United States and Idaho Constitutions and sets forth specific time limits within
which a criminal defendant must be brought to trial. State v. Clark, 135 Idaho
255, 257, 16 P.3d 931, 933 (2000).

Specifically, the portion of the

statute

relevant to this case provides:
The court, unless good cause to the contrary is shown, must
order the prosecution or indictment to be dismissed, in the following
cases:

(2) If a defendant, whose trial has not been postponed upon
his application, is not brought to trial within six (6) months from the
date that the information is filed with the court.
I.C. § 19-3501 (2). For purposes of this statute, "good cause means that there is
a substantial reason that rises to the level of a legal excuse for the delay." Clark,
135 Idaho at 260, 16 P.3d at 936 (citing State v. Johnson, 119 Idaho 56, 58, 803
P.2d 557, 559 (Ct. App. 1990); State v. Stuart, 113 Idaho 494, 496, 745 P.2d
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1115, 1117 (Ct. App. 1987); accord State v. Young, 136 Idaho 113, 116,29 P.3d
949, 952 (2001).
There is no fixed rule for determining whether good cause exists to delay
a trial and, as such, the matter is initially left to the discretion of the trial court.
Young, 136 Idaho at 116, 29 P.3d at 952 (citing Clark, 135 Idaho at 260,16 P.3d
at 936). The trial court's discretion is not unbridled, however, and its decision is
subject to independent review on appeal.

&

Ultimately, "whether legal excuse

has been shown is a matter for judicial determination upon the facts and
circumstances of each case." Clark, 135 Idaho at 260, 16 P.3d at 936 (citing
Johnson, 119 Idaho at 58,803 P.2d at 559; Stuart, 113 Idaho at 496,745 P.2d at
1117).
In this case, the state filed the Information charging Ciccone with two
counts of first degree murder on January 27, 2004.

(R, vol. I, pp.60-61.)

Ciccone's trial was originally set to commence on July 20, 2004 (R, vol. I, pp.6263, 66-67), one week before the expiration of the sixth-month statutory speedy
trial period of I.C. § 19-3501(2). On July 16, 2004, the state filed a motion to
continue the trial, asserting as the primary basis for its request that several of its
witnesses were active duty military personnel assigned to temporary duty ("TDY")
outside the state and were unavailable for trial.

(R, vol. I, pp.1 02-1 09.) The

district court conducted a hearing on the motion, at which Ciccone's trial counsel
objected to a continuance and asserted Ciccone's speedy trial rig hts. (7/19/04
Tr., p.19, L.13 - p.24, L.7.) After considering all of the information before it, the
district court granted the state's request for a continuance, finding that the state
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had carried its burden of demonstrating good cause for the delay.3 (7/19/04 Tr.,
p.26, L.24 - p.32, L.8.) Contrary to Ciccone's arguments on appeal, application
of the law to the facts and circumstances of this case supports the district court's
determination that the state's witnesses were unavailable and, as such, good
cause existed to continue the trial. 4
It is well established that the unavailability of a witness constitutes a valid
reason to justify delay of a trial.

Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 531 (1972);

Clark, 135 Idaho at 260,16 P.3d at 936; Davis, 141 Idaho at 837,118 P.3d at
169. To demonstrate witness unavailability, the state is required to show more
than mere inconvenience, i.e., that "attendance at trial would be burdensome."

3 In finding good cause, the district court specifically stated that it had relied on,
among other things, "the affidavits and statements of the State." (7/19/04 Tr.,
p.27, L.23 - p.28, L.3.) According to the Register of Actions, the state only filed
one affidavit in support of its motion for a continuance. (See R., vol. I, p.5.) The
affidavit, in which the prosecutor merely attested that the facts contained in the
motion for a continuance were all true, has been included by augmentation in the
appellate record in Docket No. 36877. (See Docket No. 36877 Court File:
5/18/09 Order Granting Uncontested Motion To Augment The Record.)
4 In addition to asserting the unavailability of several of its witnesses, the state
also asserted as ancillary bases for its request for a continuance that: 1) the
defense had only very recently provided the state with the curriculum vitae of its
accident reconstruction expert (R., vol. I, pp.105-06; 7/19/04 Tr., p.15, L.9 - p.16,
L.22), and 2) the parties needed more time than originally allotted to fully try the
case (7/19/04 Tr., p.16, L.25 - p.19, L.9). The district court considered each of
these asserted bases as factors in its decision to grant the state's motion for a
continuance (7/19/04 Tr., p.27, L.23 - p.28, L.23, p.31, Ls.12-21) but, in
evaluating the reason for the delay, ultimately focused on the facts and
circumstances surrounding the unavailability of the state's witnesses (7/19/04 Tr.,
p.28, L.24 - p.30, L.11). The state believes the trial court's determination as to
the unavailability of witnesses is dispositive of Ciccone's statutory speedy trial
claim and therefore limits its analysis of the reason for delay to this issue. The
state, however, does not waive these additional grounds for delay but relies on
and incorporates by reference herein the prosecutor's argument and the district
court's rationale.
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Clark, 135 Idaho at 260, 16 P.3d at 936; Davis, 141 Idaho at 837, 118 P.3d at
169. Rather, "[t]rue unavailability suggests an unqualified inability to attend."

kL.

Although the Idaho appellate courts have never addressed whether a witness'
assignment to military duty constitutes unavailability for purposes of determining
whether good cause exists to delay a trial, other courts that have considered the
issue hold that the unavailability of a material witness due to service in the United
States armed forces constitutes sufficient justification for delay.

See,~,

Bell v.

State, 651 S.E.2d 218, 219-20 (Ga. App. 2007); Commonwealth v. Hyland, 875
A.2d 1175, 1190-92 (Pa. 2005); Kelley v. Commonwealth, 439 S.E.2d 616, 619
(Va. App. 1994).
In its written motion for a continuance, the state identified seven material
witnesses, six of whom the state represented were either TDY or otherwise
unavailable for trial due to active duty military service. (R., vol. I, pp.103-105.) At
the hearing on the state's motion, the prosecutor elaborated on the witnesses'
status, noting that three of them (Michael Almond, Jeremy Christianson and
Jason Delion) were on TDY assignment in South Korea, and that a fourth (Steve
Brown) was on active National Guard duty in Texas preparing for a two-year
deployment to Iraq.

(7/19/04 Tr., p.9, L.18 - p.12, L.3.)

The state also

represented, both in its written motion and at the hearing, that, despite diligent
efforts by the state, the names of most of the witnesses were not disclosed to the
state because of military procedures until the end of June and that, upon
disclosure, the state immediately sent out subpoenas but received information in
July that many of the witnesses were unavailable due to their assignments in the
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military.

(R., vol. I, pp.102-03, 105; 7/19/04 Tr., p.9, Ls.1-25, p.11, Ls.15-21,

p.24, L.1 0 - p.25, L.1.)
In ruling on the state's motion for a continuance, the district court
considered the state's representations and determined, based on the facts and
circumstances of this case, that the state had established good cause for
continuance of the trial beyond the six-month statutory speedy trial period of I.C.

§ 19-3501. Specifically, the court explained:
[IJt appears that the prosecution in this case did make efforts
to be in touch with the Air Force with regard to these witnesses;
that according to the affidavit the Information with regard to the
witnesses was not provided until June; that the prosecution was not
advised that some of those witnesses were out of the country, out
of reach of the subpoena power of this court until July a few days
prior to trial.
Certainly hindsight is always 20-20. And the fact of the
matter is that we must recognize that this is a military community
and military do in fact have their own procedures and the United
States is at the current time in a state of war in two countries. And
that military personnel are being switched around, moved for
training on a regular basis, which creates a problem for the
prosecution. Probably even greater than those that are presented
when the United States is not in that situation.
Prosecution's representation is that it did not know that these
witnesses would not be available until July. Intent is a key element
in a first degree murder trial and certain of these witnesses directly
relate to the issue of intent. Not only is the defendant ... entitled to
a fair and speedy trial, but the people as well are entitled to a fair
and speedy trial. And it would be ... an extreme hardship on the
State to attempt to obtain these people on such short notice. It is
possible they could not be obtained at all.
(7/19/04 Tr., p.29, L.5 - p.30, L.11.)
On

appeal,

Ciccone does

not challenge

the

trial

court's factual

determination that certain witnesses identified by the state in its motion were
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material to the state's case on the issue of Ciccone's intent. Nor does he dispute
that at least six of the witnesses were TDY or otherwise assigned to armed
forces duty out of the state. He argues, however, that the state was negligent in
its efforts to locate the witnesses because, rather than conducting its own
investigation, the state relied upon the Air Force's investigation to ascertain the
witnesses' identities and whereabouts.

(Appellant's brief, pp.27-28, 37.)

Ciccone has failed to show error in the trial court's good cause determination,
however, because he has failed to show either that the state was negligent, or
that any negligence contributed to the unavailability of the witnesses who were
on active military duty.
As Ciccone repeatedly emphasizes on appeal, at the time he committed
the murders in this case he was a Staff Sergeant in the United States Air Force,
stationed at the Mountain Home Air Force Base. All of the witnesses the state
identified in its motion for a continuance were active duty or retired military
personnel who had knowledge of facts relevant to the crimes committed by
another member of the armed forces.

(R., pp.102-05.)

Although Ciccone

contends that the state should have duplicated the Air Force's investigative
efforts, he has failed to cite any authority or point to any facts to establish that the
state should have, or even could have, ascertained the witnesses' identities and
whereabouts more expediently than was accomplished by the internal military
investigation. The district court specifically found that the crime occurred in a
military community, that the military has its own procedures, and that the state
did make diligent efforts to obtain the information from the Air Force within the
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deadlines for discovery. (7/19/04 Tr., p.29, Ls.5-17.) Ciccone's claim that the
state was negligent in not conducting its own investigation not only ignores the
trial court's factual findings, it also fails to take into account the unique facts and
circumstances of this case.
Even assuming the state was somehow negligent in not conducting its
own investigation, Ciccone has failed to show how any such negligence actually
contributed to the unavailability of the witnesses who were TDY or its functional
equivalent.

Admittedly, the state identified one witness (Robert Reagan) who

was not on active duty and who, had the state made an earlier attempt to locate
him, may have been available to testify at trial. (R., vol. I, p.104.) However, the
remaining six witnesses were out of the state (or country) on orders of the federal
government.

There is simply no reason to believe that, had the state made

earlier attempts to locate those witnesses, their military assignments would still
not have prevented them from attending the July 2004 trial. Indeed, at least one
court has recognized that a witness' military deployment is a circumstance
beyond the state's control. See Commonwealth v. Hyland, 875 A.2d 1175, 1191
(Pa. 2005) (the deployment of a material witness to the Middle East was a
circumstance over which the prosecution had no control).
Ciccone relies on an unpublished opinion, People v. Chardon, 2005 WL
2866923 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2005) (unpublished opinion), for the proposition that the
state is required to do more than show that a witness has been deployed for
military service in order to establish that the witness is "truly unavailable" for
purposes of establishing good cause to delay the trial beyond the statutory

26

speedy trial period. (Appellant's brief, pp.28-29.) The trial court's reasoning in
Chardon is unpersuasive, however, because it was subsequently disavowed by
the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York who, in a published
opinion, held that the complaining witnesses' deployment for military service in
Korea constituted an "exceptional circumstance" under New York's speedy trial
statute, such that the delay owing to the witness' unavailability during the period
of military service could not be attributed to the state. People v. Chardon, 922
NY.S.2d 127, 128-29 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011).
This is not a case in which the state sought a continuance of the trial
merely for the purpose of accommodating the witnesses' schedules. Compare
State v. Clark, 135 Idaho 255, 260-61, 16 P.3d 931, 936-37 (2000).

Nor is it a

case in which the state's negligence contributed to the unavailability of the
witnesses.

Compare Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 652-53 (1992).

The witnesses' military assignments were matters beyond the state's control and
rendered the witnesses unavailable for trial.

~,

Bell v. State, 651 S.E.2d 218,

219-20 (Ga. App. 2007); Hyland, 875 A.2d at 1190-92; Kelley v. Commonwealth,
439 S.E.2d 616, 619 (Va. App. 1994). The district court correctly determined,
based on the facts and circumstances of this case, that the unavailability of the
state's witnesses constituted good cause to delay Ciccone's trial beyond the sixmonth statutory deadline of I.C. § 19-3501. Ciccone has failed to establish a
violation of his statutory speedy trial rights.
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2.

If There Was A Statutory Speedy Trial Violation, It Was Harmless

Even if the unavailability of the state's witnesses did not constitute good
cause sufficient to justify delay of the trial beyond the six-month statutory period
of I.C. § 19-3501, any error in the court's decision to continue the trial was
harmless. Idaho Criminal Rule 52 provides that "[a]ny error, defect, irregularity or
variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded."

Where,

as here, a defendant is facing felony charges, the remedy for a statutory speedy
trial violation is dismissal without prejudice.

See I.C. §§ 19-3501, 19-3506.

Thus, even had the trial court dismissed the case on the basis of a statutory
speedy trial violation, the state could have simply re-filed the charges and
proceeded to trial against Ciccone in a new criminal action. But see State v.
Stuart, 113 Idaho 494, 745 P.2d 1115 (Ct. App. 1987) (reversing felony judgment
of conviction on basis of statutory speedy trial violation, albeit without engaging in
harmless error analysis).
The state relies upon the argument contained in section 11.0.4, infra, to
show that the trial court's resetting of Ciccone's trial date several months beyond
the statutory speedy trial deadline did not adversely affect Ciccone's due process
rights to a fair trial. Errors that do not affect the fairness of the trial, where one is
had, are generally not reviewable on appeal. See State v. Mitche", 104 Idaho
493,500,660 P.2d 1336, 1343 (1983) (claim of error in preliminary hearing is not
ground to vacate conviction after fair trial); Loomis v. Killeen, 135 Idaho 607, 613,
21 P.3d 929, 935 (Ct. App. 2001) (claim of errors in preliminary parole hearing
not reviewed where there was fair parole violation hearing). Because the record
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shows that the alleged violation of I. C. 19-3501 of having Ciccone's trial set
beyond the six-month statutory speedy trial deadline did not actually affect the
fairness of his criminal proceeding or trial, the error is necessarily harmless.

D.

The District Court Correctly Applied The Law To The Facts In Concluding
That Ciccone Failed To Establish A Violation Of His Constitutional Speedy
Trial Rights
"Both the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1,

§ 13 of the Idaho Constitution guarantee to criminal defendants the right to a
speedy trial." State v. Lopez, 144 Idaho 349, 352, 160 P.3d 1284, 1287 (Ct. App.
2007).

When analyzing claims of speedy trial violations under the state and

federal constitutions, the Idaho appellate courts utilize the four-part balancing test
set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514
(1972). State v. Folk, 151 Idaho 327, _ , 256 P.3d 735, 740 (2011); State v.
Young, 136 Idaho 113,117,29 P.3d 949,953 (2001); Lopez, 144 Idaho at 352,
160 P.3d at 1288; State v. Avila, 143 Idaho 849,853,153 P.3d 1195, 1199 (Ct.
App.2006). The factors to be considered are: (1) the length of the delay; (2) the
reason for the delay; (3) the defendant's assertion of his or her right to a speedy
trial; and (4) the prejudice occasioned by the delay. Barker, 407 U.S. at 530.
Contrary to Ciccone's arguments on appeal, balancing of these factors in
this case supports the district court's determination that Ciccone failed to
establish a violation of his constitutional rights to a speedy trial.

29

1.

The Length Of The Delay. While Sufficient To Trigger Balancing.
Does Not Weigh In Ciccone's Favor

"The length of the delay is to some extent a triggering mechanism. Until
there is some delay which is presumptively prejudicial, there is no necessity for
inquiry into the other factors that go into the balance." Barker, 407 U.S. at 530.
For purposes of the Sixth Amendment, "the period of delay is measured from the
date there is 'a formal indictment or information or else the actual restraints
imposed by arrest and holding to answer a criminal charge.'" Lopez, 144 Idaho
at 352, 160 P.3d at 1287 (citing United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 320
(1971); Young, 136 Idaho at 117, 29 P.3d at 953.) Similarly, "[u]nder the Idaho
Constitution, the period of delay is measured from the date formal charges are
filed or the defendant is arrested, whichever occurs first." Young, 136 Idaho at
117, 29 P.3d at 953, quoted in Folk, 151 Idaho at _ , 256 P.3d at 740; Lopez,
144 Idaho at 352, 160 P. 3d at 1287 (citations omitted). Once the balancing test
is triggered, the length of delay also becomes a factor in and of itself. Avila, 143
Idaho at 853, 153 P.3d at 1199.
Ciccone was arrested on October 16, 2003, and the state brought him to
trial on January 4, 2005. The state concedes that the delay of nearly 15 months
is sufficient to trigger the Barker balancing test - but not by much. See Folk,
151 Idaho at _ , 256 P.3d at 741 ("Considering the crime charged [lewd
conduct], a delay of almost one year is sufficient to trigger our inquiry into
whether Defendant has been denied a speedy trial); State v. Campbell, 104
Idaho 705,708,662 P.2d 1149, 1152 (Ct. App. 1983) (citing State v. Talmage,
104 Idaho 249, 252, 658 P.2d 920, 923 (1983)) ("A delay of [approximately 12
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months] is sufficient to trigger an inquiry into whether speedy trial has been
denied."). As noted in Barker, the reasonableness of length of the delay must be
evaluated in light of the nature of the offense for which the defendant is standing
trial:

"[T]he delay that can be tolerated for an ordinary street crime is

considerably less than for a serious, complex conspiracy charge." Barker, 407
U.S. 531. Considering the nature of the charges on which Ciccone was standing
trial - two counts of first degree murder - the length of the delay was not
substantial and does not weigh heavily in Ciccone's favor.
Moreover, the length of the delay is not dispositive.

None of the four

Barker factors is by itself "either a necessary or sufficient condition to the finding
of a deprivation of the right of speedy triaL" Barker, 407 U.S. at 533. Because
there were valid reasons for the delay, and because Ciccone was not unfairly
prejudiced by the delay, the length of the delay should be excused.

2.

The Unavailability Of The State's Witnesses Constituted A Valid
Reason For The Delay

Implicit in the standards applicable to claims of constitutional speedy trial
violations is the recognition that "pretrial delay is often both inevitable and wholly
justifiable." Avila, 143 Idaho at 853, 153 P.3d at 1199 (citing Doggett v. United
States, 505 U.S. 647, 656 (1992»; State v. Davis, 141 Idaho 828, 837, 118 P.3d
160, 169 (Ct. App. 2005) (same). For that reason, different weights are assigned
to different reasons for the delay. Barker, 407 U.S. at 531. As explained by the
Supreme Court:
A deliberate attempt to delay the trial in order to hamper the
defense should be weighted heavily against the government. A
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more neutral reason such as negligence or overcrowded courts
should be weighted less heavily but nevertheless should be
considered since the ultimate responsibility for such circumstances
must rest with the government rather than with the defendant.
Finally, a valid reason, such as a missing witness, should serve to
justify appropriate delay.

kl at 531 (footnote omitted).
Ciccone concedes on appeal that the state is not responsible for a month
and a half of the nearly 15-month delay in bringing him to trial. (Appellant's brief,
pp.24-25.) He also concedes that the state never deliberately delayed the case
in order to hamper the defense.

(Id., p.25.)

He argues, however, that the

remaining delay must be weighed against the state, contending that the state
failed to present any valid reason to justify the delay in bringing him to trial. (Id.,
pp.25-34.)

Ciccone's argument is without merit.

For the reasons set forth in

section II.C.I, supra, the district court correctly determined that the state's
witnesses were unavailable and that their unavailability constituted a valid reason
to justify an appropriate delay. Even if the state could be deemed to have been
negligent in its preparation of the case, as suggested by Ciccone on appeal, a
"delay resulting from negligence," though it must be considered, "is a more
neutral reason that is weighed less heavily than delay intended to hamper a
defense." Folk, 151 Idaho at _
531).

256 P.3d at 742-43 (citing Barker, 40 U.S. at

Likewise, although the responsibility for the trial court's inability to

reschedule Ciccone's trial for an additional six months must "rest with the
government," the court's busy calendar is ultimately a neutral reason for the
delay and, although it must be considered, does not weigh heavily against the
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state. Barker, 407 U.S. at 531; State v. Clark, 135 Idaho 255,261, 16 P.3d 931,
937 (2000).

3.

Ciccone Did Not Timely Assert His Constitutional Speedy Trial
Rights

The third factor in the Barker analysis is whether and how the defendant
asserted his constitutional right to a speedy trial. A defendant's assertion of his
right is "entitled to strong evidentiary weight in determining whether the
defendant is being deprived of the right." Barker, 407 U.S. at 531-32; Davis, 141
Idaho 839, 118 P.3d at 171. "[F]ailure to assert the right will make it difficult for a
defendant to prove that he was denied a speedy trial." kL
Although Ciccone asserted his statutory right to a speedy trial at the July
19, 2004 hearing on the state's motion for a continuance (7/19/04 Tr., p.19,
Ls.13-23), he did not unequivocally assert a constitutional right to a speedy trial
until he filed his motion to dismiss on December 20, 2004 (R., vol. II, pp.168-69;
see also Trial Tr., p.41, L.18 - p.43, L.2). This assertion of rights came over 14
months after his arrest and just two weeks before his January 4, 2005 trial was
set to commence. Ciccone's assertion of his rights so late in the proceedings
does not weigh in favor of dismissal under the Barker balancing test. See State
v. Lopez, 144 Idaho 349,353, 160 P.3d 1284, 1288 (Ct. App. 2007); Davis, 141
Idaho at 839, 118 P.3d at 171; State v. Rodriquez-Perez, 129 Idaho 29, 37, 921
P.2d 206,214 (Ct. App. 1996).
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4.

Ciccone Failed To Establish That He Was Unfairly Preiudiced By
The Delay

The final and most important factor in the Barker analysis is the nature
and extent of any prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of the delay.
Barker, 407 U.S. at 532; Lopez, 144 Idaho at 354, 160 P.3d at 1289; Davis, 141
Idaho at 840, 118 P.3d at 172. As explained by the Idaho Supreme Court:
Prejudice is to be assessed in light of the interests of defendants
which the right to a speedy trial is designed to protect. Those
interests are (1) to prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration; (2) to
minimize anxiety and concern of the accused, and (3) to limit the
possibility that the defense will be impaired.
Young, 136 Idaho at 118, 29 P.3d at 954 (citing Barker, 407 U.S. at 532). Accord
Lopez, 144 Idaho at 354-55, 160 P.3d at 1289-90; Avila, 143 Idaho at 854, 153
P.3d at 1200; Davis, 141 Idaho at 840, 118 P.3d at 172. "The third of these is
the most significant because a hindrance to adequate preparation of the defense
'skews the fairness of the entire system.'" Lopez, 144 Idaho at 355, 160 P.3d at
1290 (citing Barker, 407 U.S. at 532; State v. Hernandez, 133 Idaho 576, 583,
990 P.2d 742, 749 (Ct. App. 1999)).
There is no question that Ciccone was continuously incarcerated in jail for
15 months while awaiting trial, and during that time he undoubtedly felt the
anxiety and concern that any incarcerated individual would suffer.

Despite

Ciccone's argument to the contrary, however, there simply is no evidence in the
record to support his claim that his defense was actually impaired by the delay.
In fact, the only "prejudice" Ciccone cites is the fact that, at trial, one of the state's
witnesses failed to recall having been asked a specific question at the preliminary
hearing. (Appellant's brief, pp.35-36.) This fact hardly establishes impairment of
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the defense, however, particularly since a review of the trial transcript shows that
Ciccone's counsel ably cross-examined the state's witness and impeached her
with her preliminary hearing testimony (see Trial Tr., p.520, L.9 - p.524, L.23,
p.540, L.19 - p.542, L.19) and thereafter specifically made use of the witness'
inconsistent statements during closing argument (see Trial Tr., p.1827, Ls.5-25).
Ciccone's remaining claim - that, in light of one witness' lapse of memory "one
must wonder how reliable any of the witness' testimony was so long after the
fact" (Appellant's brief, p.36) - is speculative on its face and falls far short of
demonstrating actual prejudice. See United States v. Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. 302,
315 (1986) (alleging only a "possibility of prejudice is not sufficient to support" a
claim of a speedy trial violation).

5.

A Balancing Of The Barker Factors Weighs Against A Finding Of A
Speedy Trial Violation

The four Barker factors, together with any other relevant circumstances,
must be balanced and weighed to determine whether an individual's right to a
speedy trial was violated. Barker, 407 U.S. at 533. In this case, although the
length of the delay was sufficient to trigger a constitutional analysis, the
remaining factors, on balance, weigh against a finding of a speedy trial violation.
The state sought the delay for a valid reason and, although some of the delay
was attributable to the court's calendar, Ciccone failed to timely assert his
constitutional speedy trial rights and failed to demonstrate that he was unfairly
prejudiced by the delay. Ciccone has therefore failed to show error in the denial
of his motion to dismiss.
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III.
Ciccone Has Failed To Establish An Abuse Of The District Court's Sentencing
Discretion
A.

Introduction
The district court imposed a fixed life sentence upon Ciccone's conviction

for the first degree murder of his wife, Kathleen, and a concurrent fixed 15-year
sentence upon his conviction for the second degree murder of the fetus Kathleen
was carrying when she died. (R., vol. II, pp.338-41.) Ciccone does not challenge
the reasonableness of the fixed 15-year sentence in relation to his second
degree murder conviction.

He argues, however, that the fixed life sentence

imposed upon his conviction for first degree murder "is excessive given any view
of the facts." (Appellant's brief, p.38 (emphasis added).) In addition to applying
the incorrect legal standard,5 the arguments Ciccone advances in support of his
claim also fail to establish an abuse of discretion.

B.

Standard Of Review
The sentence imposed by a trial court is reviewed for a clear abuse of

discretion.

State v. Windom, 150 Idaho 873, 875, 253 P.3d 310, 312 (2011);

State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 148, 191 P.3d 217, 226 (2008); State v. Baker,
136 Idaho 576,577,38 P.3d 614, 615 (2001) (citing State v. Zaitseva, 135 Idaho
11, 13 P.3d 338 (2000)).

5 The correct standard is whether the "sentence was excessive under any
reasonable view of the facts." State v. Windom, 150 Idaho 873, 253 P.3d 310,
312 (2011) (emphasis added) (citations and internal quotations omitted).
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C.

Ciccone Has Failed To Establish That The Fixed Life Sentence Imposed
Upon His Conviction For The First Degree Murder Of His Pregnant Wife Is
Excessive Under Any Reasonable View Of The Facts
Ciccone was convicted, after a ten-day jury trial, of first degree murder.

(R., vol. II, pp.286-89.) The victim, Ciccone's wife, was only 22 years old and

was 11 weeks pregnant when Ciccone deliberately ran her down with his car.
(PSI, p.19.)

Despite the fact that the jury found Ciccone guilty beyond a

reasonable doubt of intentionally, and with premeditation, murdering Kathleen,
Ciccone has never accepted responsibility nor expressed any remorse for the
criminality of his actions. Ciccone's character, together with the egregiousness
of the offense, his history of violence and his lack of rehabilitative potential, all
support the district court's sentencing determination that society deserves to be
protected from Ciccone for the rest of his natural life.
The applicable legal standards for reviewing a sentencing court's exercise
of discretion are well established. Where, a sentence is within statutory limits,
the appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that it is a clear abuse of
discretion.

State v. Windom, 150 Idaho 873,875,253 P.3d 310,312 (2011);

State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 148, 191 P.3d 217, 226 (2008). To carry this
burden the appellant must show that the sentence is excessive under any
reasonable view of the facts.

Windom, 150 Idaho at 875, 253 P.3d at 312

(citations omitted). A sentence is reasonable, however, if it appears necessary to
achieve the primary objective of protecting society or any of the related
sentencing goals of deterrence, rehabilitation or retribution.

kL.

at 875-76, 253

P.3d at 312-13; State v. Baker, 136 Idaho 576,577,38 P.3d 614, 615 (2001).
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First degree murder is punishable by a maximum allowable sentence of
fixed life imprisonment. I.C. § 18-4004. Because the fixed life sentence imposed
upon Ciccone's conviction is within the statutory limit, Ciccone bears the burden
on appeal of showing that his sentence is excessive. State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho
598, 604, 768 P.2d 1331, 1337 (1989).

On appeal, the question before this

Court is not what sentence it would have imposed, but rather, whether the district
court abused its discretion. State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 148-49, 191 P.3d
217, 226-27 (2008) (citing State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 568, 650 P.2d 707,
710 (Ct. App. 1982)); see also Windom, 150 Idaho at 875, 253 P.3d at 312
(,,[W]here reasonable minds might differ, the discretion vested in the trial court
will be respected, and this Court will not supplant the views of the trial court with
its own."). Although Ciccone's sentence is unquestionably weighty, he has not
demonstrated from the record any abuse of discretion in the district court's
determination that a fixed life term of imprisonment was not only warranted, but
also necessary, under the facts of this case.
The Idaho Supreme Court has held:

"To impose a fixed life sentence

requires a high degree of certainty that the perpetrator could never be safely
released back into society or that the nature of the offense requires that the
individual spend the rest of his life behind bars." Windom, 150 Idaho at 876, 253
P.3d at 313 (citing Stevens, 146 Idaho at 149, 191 P.3d at 227; State v. Cross,
132 Idaho 667, 672, 978 P.2d 227, 232 (1999)) (internal quotations and
emphasis omitted); accord State v. Perez, 145 Idaho 383, 388, 179 P.3d 346,
351 (Ct. App. 2008) (quoting State v. Eubank, 114 Idaho 635,638,759 P.2d 926,
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929 (Ct. App. 1988)) (a fixed life sentence "should be regarded as a sentence
requiring a high degree of certainty - certainty that the nature of the crime
demands incarceration until the perpetrator dies in prison, or certainty that the
perpetrator never, at any time in his life, could be safely released."). This "high
degree of certainty" is generally satisfied where "the offense is so egregious that
it demands an exceptionally severe measure of retribution and deterrence, or if
the offender so utterly lacks rehabilitative potential that imprisonment until death
is the only feasible means of protecting society." Perez, 145 Idaho at 388, 179
P.3d at 351 (emphasis added). Although Ciccone argues otherwise, the record
clearly shows the existence of both of these circumstances in this case.
The egregiousness of Ciccone's offense was established at trial through
physical evidence and the testimony of several witnesses who were either at the
scene when Kathleen died or who responded to and investigated the scene
shortly after her death.

Before Ciccone hit Kathleen with his car, a neighbor

heard him revving his engine and peeling out. (Trial Tr., p.722, L.13 - p.723,
L.7.) He raced down the dirt road at a speed at or near 50 miles per hour and,
without braking or attempting to maneuver his vehicle, plowed the car into
Kathleen, causing her to strike her head on the car and then fly into the air,
through a fence and, ultimately, land against a tree 75 feet away from the point of
impact.

(Trial Tr., p.1000, L.21 - p.1003, L.15, p.1042, Ls.2-9 p.1112, L.4 -

p.1131, L.17.) Kathleen suffered multiple massive skull fractures and she and
her unborn child died at the scene. (Trial Tr., p.563, L.23 - p.565, L.21, p.576,
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L.21 - p.577, L.14, p.603, L.18 - p.604, L.4, p.664, L.25 - p.667, L.10, p.1309,
Ls.1-24.)
Although he had just run over his pregnant wife, Ciccone only applied his
brakes in an unsuccessful attempt to avoid a mailbox on the side of the road.
(Trial Tr., p.1112, L.4 - p.1114, L.18.) By the time Ciccone stopped and got out
of his vehicle, Darlene Shaw, the owner of the property on which Kathleen's body
landed, had already rushed to Kathleen's aid.

(Trial Tr., p.506, L.25 - p.509,

L.19, p.511, L.9 - p.515, L.12.) Ciccone was very composed; he peered from a
distance at Kathleen's body and then made a call on his cell phone, but not to
911. (Trial Tr., p.515, L.23 - p.517, L.20.) Ms. Shaw implored Ciccone to come
back, but he refused and continued walking down the road away from the scene.
(Trial Tr., p.518, L.16 - p.519, L.11.)
Ms. Shaw and her daughter contacted 911, and paramedics and law
enforcement were dispatched to the scene. (Trial Tr., p.635, L.3 - p.638, L.13,
p.639, Ls.11-23.) Alan Roberts was the first person to respond. Approximately
one-quarter mile before he reached the crash site, Mr. Roberts observed Ciccone
walking down the road the opposite direction.

(Trial Tr., p.598, L.10 - p.599,

L.18.) Mr. Roberts made three attempts to talk to Ciccone. (Trial Tr., p.599, L.19
- p.600, L.12.)

The first time, Ciccone did not respond; the second time, he

waved Mr. Roberts off; the third time, he responded, "she needs your help worse
than I do," and kept walking away from the scene. (Trial Tr., p.599, L.19 - p.601,
L.16, p.627, Ls.4-9.)

Law enforcement and rescue personnel subsequently

found Ciccone in the desert about a mile and a half away. (Trial Tr., p. 609, L.1 -
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p.611, L.19, p.669, L.6 - p.671, L.22, p.992, L.18 - p.993, L.3, p.1165, Ls.8-13,
p.1179, Ls.14-16, p.1311, L.18 - p.1313, L.11.) He claimed to have blacked out,
but a CT scan and physical examination detected no sign of head trauma or
other abnormalities.

(Trial Tr., p.614, Ls.5-12, p.672, L.5 - p.677, L.8, p.683,

L.22 - p.684, L.22, p.1166, L.5 - p.1167, L.4, p.1170, L.10 - p.1178, L.13,
p.1181, L.16 - p.1182, L.9, p.1318, L.5 - p.1329, L.2.) He also made statements
that led the lead detective on the case to suspect Ciccone was feigning his
claimed amnesia.

(State's Exhibit 62, pp.36-37; PSI, p.3; 10/16/03 Elmore

County Sheriff's Department report of Detective Catherine M. Wolfe (included
with PSI), pp.6-8.)
Throughout the proceedings in this case Ciccone claimed that Kathleen's
death was an accident, caused by his careless driving.

As set forth above,

however, the physical evidence and Ciccone's bizarre behavior overwhelmingly
established that Ciccone deliberately ran Kathleen down. Ciccone's continued
claim on appeal that Kathleen's death was an accident is simply not borne out by
the evidence and is directly contrary to the jury's findings of fact.
Ciccone asks this Court to ignore the egregiousness of the offense and
focus instead on his potential for rehabilitation, which he claims is demonstrated
by his family support, military service and lack of a prior criminal record.
(Appellant's brief, pp.40-43.)

He also asks this Court to consider his mental

condition as a mitigating factor that militates against the fixed life sentence
imposed upon his conviction for first degree murder. (Appellant's brief, pp.43-
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50.) Contrary to Ciccone's assertions, however, none of these factors renders
his fixed life sentence unreasonable.
Although Ciccone has the support of his family, has served in the military
and has no prior criminal record, he is not the upstanding, compassionate man of
generally good character that he portrays himself to be. Rather, in looking at the
presentence report, including the materials submitted by members of his own
family, it is clear Ciccone has always had an explosive temper.

In a letter

attached to the presentence report, Ciccone's sister wrote: "Frustration, anger,
hurt, loneliness, depression, sorrow, pain, boredom, all of those emotions
seemed to come out in fits of rage in both men in our family, my dad and my
brother."

(PSI, p.13.)

Ciccone's ex-wife stated that Ciccone was "very

controlling, closed and jealous" and was "physically abusive throughout their
marriage." (PSI, p.15; U.S.A.F. Report of Investigation (included with PSI), § 213.) She estimated Ciccone "hit her once a month or at least once every other
month during their entire marriage." (PSI, p.15.)
The foregoing accounts are also entirely consistent with Ciccone's
treatment of Kathleen.

According to witnesses, Ciccone was controlling and

jealous and he verbally and physically abused Kathleen. (Trial Tr., p.1211, L.18
- p.1212, L.19, p.1247, L.5 - p.1249, L.3, p.1350, LA - p.1353, L.1, p.1354,
Ls.2-4, p.1357, L.25 - p.1358, L.25, p.1440, L.22 - p.1446, L.1; 10/23/03
Supplemental Report of Detective Captain Mike Barclay (included with PSI);
U.S.A.F. Report of Investigation (included with PSI), §§ 2-2 - 2-5, 2-7, 2-9.) He
had previously attempted to run her over (Trial Tr., p.1949, Ls.3-7) and, on the
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day she died, there was evidence at the scene that suggested Ciccone had
engaged in a physical confrontation with her. (Trial Tr., p.883, L.18 - p.888, LA.)
Thus, despite Ciccone's claims to the contrary, his act of callously running
Kathleen down and leaving her and her unborn baby to die was entirely
consistent with his character.
Ciccone also asks this Court to consider "his fragile mental state" as a
factor mitigating against the life sentence he received. (Appellant's brief, pA3.)
He notes that he has a family history of mental illness and that he himself
attempted to commit suicide and claims, in light of this, that mental illness must
have had a central role in the commission of the offense.
ppAO-50.)

(Appellant's brief,

Ciccone fails to point out, however, that although he specifically

requested and received a psychological evaluation at public expense (R, vol. II,
pp.332-33; 3/21/05 Tr., p.73, Ls.9-24), he chose not to utilize the information
gleaned from that evaluation for the purposes of sentencing (Trial Tr., p.1880,
L.12 - p.1882, L.1), thus depriving the district court of any opportunity to evaluate
the nature and extent of Ciccone's mental condition andlor his amenability to
treatment. Instead, he asks this Court for the first time on appeal to conclude his
sentence is excessive simply because of his family history of mental illness and
his own prior suicide attempt. There is no evidence, however, that he in fact has
a mental illness or that his suicide attempt was the result of such an illness, as
opposed merely to attention-seeking behavior, a scenario which is entirely
plausible given the evidence of his volatile relationship with Kathleen and his
desire to control her. (See U.S.A.F. Report of Investigation (included with PSI), §
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2-3 (witness report that Ciccone had previously admitted faking a seizure to
prevent Kathleen from leaving him).)
The district court considered all the information before it, applied the
correct legal standards and correctly determined the appropriate sentence in light
of the egregious nature of the offense and Ciccone's character, which shows him
to be utterly lacking in rehabilitative potential. The sentence imposed was not
only warranted, but also necessary to achieve the primary sentencing objective
of protecting society. Ciccone has failed to carry his burden of establishing that
the sentencing court abused its discretion.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm Ciccone's conviction
and sentence.
DATED this 29 th day of February 2012.

LORI A. FLEMING
Deputy Attorney Ge ""'-'-'=-_~
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